# Round 4 – Neg v Wayne BB

## 1NC

### 1nc procedural

#### Reading a plan means they have to defend it – if they get to defend more than the plan they have to defend the whole 1AC – it’s a rhetorical artifact which means they shouldn’t get perms because it proves their speech act can shift, which is aff conditionality – makes it impossible to get stable offense and always caters to them because of the last speech

### 1nc ispec

#### A. Substantial is meaningful

**WordNet, 6** (WordNet® 3.0, © 2006 by Princeton University.

[Dictionary.reference.com/ browse/substantial](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substantial)

Substantial, adjective

 2. having a firm basis in reality and being therefore important, meaningful, or considerable; "substantial equivalents"

#### Increase requires specification

**OED, 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)

increase, v.

3. To become greater *in* some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

#### Incentive implies a particular mechanism

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 06** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

There were numerous suggestions for specific changes to the sixteen principles presented. The following list captures each suggestion (each number in parentheses corresponds to a principle presented):

􀁹 The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually implies a particular mechanism (#1).

#### This is distinct from actions with incentive effects

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993)  Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

B. Violation: they’re not topical because they don’t specify the incentives they result in for biomimetic solar power

C. Voting issue

1. Negative ground – “incentives” is the direct object of resolutional action, ALL negative strategies are premised off of it, not specifying makes the aff a conditional moving target

#### 2. Kills topic education, generic incentives don’t exist, they must be tailored

**Arvizu, 7** - Director National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “ENCOURAGING SOLAR ENERGY,” 6/19, lexis

We applaud the Committee for its continuing examination of solar and other sources of renewable electricity and fuels. If we are to ensure the nation receives the full range of benefits that renewable energy technologies can provide, we will need a carefully balanced blend of new technology, market acceptance and government policies. It is not a question of whether to rely solely on the market, or on new research, or on government action, as we work to solve our energy problems. To accelerate deployment of renewable energy technologies, we need to effectively combine all three. It's also crucial that this mix of technology, markets and policies be crafted so that each works in conjunction with the others. The reality is that distinct renewable energy technologies - be they solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, biomass power, biofuels or geothermal - are in different places in terms of their economics, technological maturity and market acceptance. While a broad range of policies are needed to spur on these varied technologies, the specifics of policies and incentives to be enacted ideally must be tailored to fit the unique requirements of each of the systems and devices we are seeking to deploy.

### 1nc k

#### Normative actions can’t solve – desire creates the illusion of the self and the suffering that defines the human condition. Our only capacity is thus to affirm the extermination of this desire in the face of perpetual death and an impermanent reality

**DOLLIMORE 1998** (Jonathan Dollimore 1998 (Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, p 54-56.)

Siddhartha Gautama (560-477 BC) was a prince who, because of his high privilege, encountered suffering and death relatively late in life. Legend tells us that when he did eventually encounter them the trauma was the greater, and changed his life: he became Buddha, the Enlightened One. In the religion he founded, life is experienced as a permanent intrinsic unsatisfactoriness manifested as suffering (dukkha) and pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping [the elements, skandbasy which make up a person] are painful. ('Sermon at Benares', in Burtt, p. 30) Everything about life involves suffering and dissatisfaction, a sense of lack. If we strive to overcome that lack we fail, and suffering becomes marked by a renewed craving, now intensified by an acute sense of loss. Suffering derives directly from the fact that everything that exists is radically mutable. In particular, happiness, if it is achieved, cannot last. Suffering haunts happiness from the outside and the inside. Where Buddhism differs from Western religions is in the full acceptance of mutability; happiness lies in achieving that acceptance. Suffering is perpetuated by, and inseparable from, ignorance, and mitigated by wisdom. The deepest ignorance is to fail to see, or to disavow, the fact that everything that exists is mutable and transient. The force of this position may be seen, again, in contrast with Christianity; for the Buddhist the source of suffering is ignorance rather than sin. And the real source of suffering is desire (kama) or craving (tanha, literally 'thirst'), both of which are intrinsic to, constitutive of, humankind. There is a Buddhist doctrine of 'conditioned arising' or 'dependent origination' which asserts that everything that exists is dependent on certain prevailing conditions; nothing is intrinsically self-sufficient, independent or stable. This is especially true of selfhood. Buddhism completely denies the idea of a transcendent or autonomous self so powerful in Western religion and philosophy. To believe that there is some essential inner self or consciousness which is the real me, ultimately identifiable apart from everything that happens to me, is an illusion: What we call a personality is just an individual stream of becoming; a cross-section of it at any given moment in an aggregate of the five skandhas which (as long as it continues) are in unstable and unceasing interaction with each other, (p. 86) There is no I. Even to believe in an I which possesses emotions (albeit helplessly) is mistaken. One of the problems with desire, and why it cannot make us happy, is that it presupposes a self which does not exist; at the core of our being we are empty. Everything that constitutes the individual is marked by the unsatisfactoriness and suffering which is dukkha. Nor is there such a thing as the soul. The person is only a fleeting series of discontinuous states held together by desire, by craving. When desire is extinguished the person is dissolved. Since life and suffering are synonymous, the extinction of desire is the goal of human endeavor. Until that happens we continue to exist through a series of rebirths. It is not death as such which is deplored, but rebirth; it is not death but rebirth which we must escape. So much so that in some early texts rebirth is described as 'redeath'. Desire perpetuates life, which is synonymous with suffering, and which leads to death. Desire perpetuates death; it keeps one dying. The self is merged with ultimate reality not by identifying the core of the self (soul/essence) with ultimate reality (God/the universal) but by extinguishing self into non-being (nirvana). This is the aspect of Buddhism which has fascinated Western philosophers like Schopenhauer and artists like Wagner; with whatever degree of misinterpretation, they have been drawn by the ideas of empowerment through renunciation, nullification and quiescence; of the apparent ability to move freely with the mutability and change which arc the apparent cause of suffering; of choosing freely not to pursue the illusion of freedom, in a sense to eliminate the illusion of self; of becoming discontinuous, mindless. Not to escape mutability but to become it; not to just go with the flow of endless change, but to become it. To achieve the state of nirvana - that is, a state of being which is essentially empty of desire and striving. The wisdom of Buddhism does not desire to transcend change or to affirm an essential ultimate relationship of self to the absolute and unchanging (Platonic forms, the Christian God); nor does the Buddhist desire to die or to cease to be (the death drive): he or she does not desire annihilation but rather learns how to cease desiring. Nirvana is the utter cessation of desire or craving; it means extinction.

#### Use the ballot to engage in meditative affirmation of the status quo.

**Astma 6 –** Professor of Philosophy at Columbia College

(Stephen, “Against Transcendentalism: Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life and Buddhism”, *Monty Python and Philosophy* ebook copy, dml)

Upon close inspection, Buddha shows, paradise crumbles. The atman, on the other hand, is a no show. The Buddha thinks that atman is nowhere to be found except in the literary inventions of Hinduism and the confusions of its followers. Buddhism, contrary to all dualistic theories, asserts that **we are not made up of two metaphysically different parts**, a permanent spirit and an impermanent body. Buddhism breaks with most religions, East and West, by recognizing that we are each a finite tangle of qualities, all of which eventually exhaust themselves, and none of which, conscious or other, carries on independently. All humans, according to Buddha, are composed of the five aggregates (khandas ); body (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (sanna), dispositions or volitional tendencies (sankhara) and consciousness (vinnana). If the Buddha was standing around in the battlefield setting of the Bhagavad Gita, he would certainly chime-in and object to Krishna’s irresponsible claim that a permanent soul resides in Arjuna and his enemies. Show me this permanent entity, the Buddha would demand. Is the body permanent? Are feelings permanent? What about perceptions, or dispositions, or even consciousness? The Buddha says “If there really existed the atman, there would be also something that belonged to this atman. As however, in truth and reality, neither an atman nor anything belonging to an atman can be found, is it not really an utter fool’s doctrine to say: This is the world, this am I; after death I shall be permanent, persisting and eternal?” (Mijjhima Nikaya) Buddha examines all the elements of the human being, finds that they are all fleeting, and finds no additional permanent entity or soul amidst the tangle of human faculties. There is no ghost in the machine. What’s So Grotesque about That? In their rejection of transcendentalism, Buddhism and Monty Python converge in their celebrations of the grotesque. The Python crew seems to relish the disgusting facts of human biology and they take every opportunity to render them through special effects. Throughout Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, blood spurts, vomit spews, babies explode from birth canals, decapitated heads abound, and limbs putrefy. Theravada Buddhism also celebrates the revolting, treating it as a meditation focus for contemplating the lack of permanence. The transcendentalist consoles herself with the idea that this physical body may decay and perish, but an eternal soul will outlast the material melt-down—not so for the Buddha. In an attempt to undercut human vanity and demonstrate the impermanence of all things, Buddhist scriptures are filled with nauseating details about rotting carcasses and putrid flesh. In the Anguttara Nikaya, for example, the scripture asks, “Did you never see in the world the corpse of a man or a woman, one or two or three days after death, swollen up, blue-black in color, and full of corruption? And did the thought never come to you that you also are subject to death, that you cannot escape it?” (III, 35) When I was at a monastery in Southern Thailand, I chanced upon some reproductions of “dhamma paintings” from the mid-nineteenth century. These pictures were from a Chaiya manuscript discovered nearby, and they depicted, in detail, the “Ten Reflections on Foulness” (asubha kammatthana). The paintings illustrate the various uses of corpses as objects for contemplating impermanence. Following the great Theravadan philosopher Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga text (“Path of Purification”), the artist rendered decaying corpses in rather comprehensive stages of dismemberment and putrification. According to Buddhaghosa, staring at a bloated corpse will be particularly useful to me if I’m feeling overly attached and arrogant about the shape and morphology of my body. If instead I’m feeling snobby or bigoted about my skin’s color or complexion, I should focus on the livid corpse that ranges from green to blue-black in color. Or, if I mistakenly feel that my body is my own, I am to rectify this error by meditating on a worm-infested corpse (puluvaka). As Buddhaghosa explains, “The body is shared by many and creatures live in dependence on (all parts and organs) and feed (on them). And there they are born, grow old, and die, evacuate and pass water; and the body is their maternity home, their hospital, their charnel ground, their privy and their urinal.” Buddhist “mindfulness” (meditational awareness) about the body is being aware of its transience, its brevity, its fugacity. The physical body is slowly macerating, and to try to hold onto it or recompose it is a pipe-dream. The single issue that invited comment from film reviewers when Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life was released was its wallow in the grotesque. One exclaimed that the film’s “ramshackle bouts of surreal physical comedy—a clotted mass of frenzied bodies, debris, mud, and gore—induce feelings of revolt and despair.”53 In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, however, this reviewer got it just backward. Far from despairing, the Pythons aimed to smash the deceptive veneer of puritanical snobbery that devalues the flesh and overvalues the invisible spirit. Like Buddhism, Python asks us to “say yes” to our true nature, **filled as it is with impermanence and unpleasantness.** At first this may seem jarring and disturbing, but in the long run **it is preferable to self-deception through figmentary transcendent reality**. Buddha’s rejection of a permanent transcendental soul is known as the anatta, or “no-self ” doctrine (and the companion doctrine that rejects the idea of a permanent God is called paticca samuppada, or “dependent arising,” because it denies the need for any transcendent uncaused cause). The most important Buddhist critique of the transcendental soul finds place in Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life. It is the idea that belief in unseen, eternal, and divine realities ultimately **distracts us from our own humanity**. Transcendentalism **dehumanizes us by feeding selfish craving**. If we embrace a worldview that pivots on the idea that we will attain immortality, then we are going to be overly concerned with our soul’s protection and its future fate. We become **more concerned with saving our own souls** than valuing and attending to the needs of those around us. Simply put, belief in a soul and a heaven of blissful happiness actually **makes you less ethical in this life**. The rejection of souls, heaven, and God, does not lead, as so many critics contend, to bleak egoistic nihilism. Many transcendentalists foretell a gloomy picture without the security of otherworldly meaning, predicting rampant hedonism (pure pleasure seeking) or nihilistic apathy. The Buddha disagrees and thinks that these life patterns are to be avoided as much as otherworldly dogmatism. The extremes, excesses, and general sufferings of the hedonist strategy and the nihilist strategy are revealed in the film. Terry’s Jones’s Mr. Creosote, for instance, is the giant embodiment of the crass pursuit of sensual gratification. After gorging himself on multiple servings of food and wine at a fancy French restaurant, his unchecked desire for the pleasures of chocolate puts him over the edge. Though he claims he can eat no more, Cleese easily seduces him with a single, small, “vaffer-thin” chocolate mint. Mr. Creosote then begins to inflate and he soon explodes, showering the restaurant in his blood and entrails. Obviously, such hedonism and self-gratification is not an appropriate fall-back for those who reject transcendental metaphysics and ethics. Nor is it appropriate to give oneself over to despair or indifference. The folly of that is illustrated in the movie’s gruesome portrayal of a liver transplant. After Graham Chapman starts the bloody business of removing this poor chap’s liver in his dining room, his partner, Cleese, chats up the man’s wife (Terry Jones in drag) in the kitchen. Cleese asks if she too would give up her liver, but she replies, “No . . . I don’t want to die.” Cleese perseveres and introduces her to Eric Idle, who steps out of her refrigerator and commences a musical tour of the sublime immensity of the universe and the tiny insignificance of her life: Just remember that you’re standing on a planet that’s evolving And revolving at nine hundred miles an hour, That’s orbiting at nineteen miles a second, so it’s reckoned, A sun that is the source of all our power. The sun and you and me and all the stars that we can see, Are moving at a million miles a day In an outer spiral arm, at forty thousand miles an hour, Of the galaxy we call the Milky Way. The Universe itself keeps on expanding and expanding In all of the directions it can whizz As fast as it can go, at the speed of light you know, Twelve million miles a minute, and that’s the fastest speed there is. So remember when you’re feeling very small and insecure How amazingly unlikely is your birth And pray that there’s intelligent life somewhere up in space Because there’s bugger all down here on earth. “Makes you feel so sort of insignificant, doesn’t it?” Cleese and Chapman ask. “Can we have your liver then?” She gives in—“Yeah. All right, you talked me into it”—and the two doctors set upon her with their knives. Just as Mr. Creosote succumbs to sensual overindulgence, this housewife opts for a groundless underindulgence. Just because she realizes she lives in an almost infinitely large universe, that is no reason for her to think that her life is worthless in itself and not worth continuing. This is what the extreme nihilist does (indeed, this is what nihilism is all about), and the Python crew is showing us the absurdity of it. Life **does not become meaningless** once you give up the idea that you are playing a role in a transcendentally planned drama. The values of family, work, love, understanding, simple pleasures, and peace, **don’t go away** once you reject transcendent meaning. Nor does the woman’s natural desire for self-preservation and the avoidance of suffering evaporate once she realizes her own finitude. Transcendental dogmatism is dehumanizing, but so are the opposing extremes of hedonism and nihilistic skepticism. The Buddha made this point explicitly when he argued for a Middle Way between all opposing extremes. Just as **one should find a middle way** between the slaveries of excessive indulgence and excessive asceticism (self-denial), so too one must avoid embracing both absolutist worldviews (like Palin’s toadying transcendentalist chaplain) and relativist worldviews (where all values and meanings are leveled or negated). The Buddha’s Middle Way doctrine seeks to reclaim human values and meaning by avoiding overly rigid blind faith and also avoiding distracting speculations about matters that are remote from lived experience. Back Down to Earth So, what are these more down-to-earth human values that must be rescued from transcendental flights-of-fancy and nihilistic negativity? In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, the extremely modest list of values offered at the end as final “answers” to the meaning of life make good sense. They are introduced by Palin (in drag) as he interrupts the Vegas-style celebration of perpetual Christmas. “Well, that’s the end of the film,” she announces. “Now here’s the Meaning of Life.” She opens an envelope and reads, “Well, it’s nothing special. Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get some walking in, and try and live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds and nations.” This rather modest sounding list makes perfect sense if we no longer pine for some more grand transcendental meaning. Once we dispatch both the otherworldly values (toadying to God and conserving our sperm, for example) and the otherworldly “realities” which ground those values (soul, heaven, God), then **matters of meaning become markedly more pragmatic and demystified**. Like Buddha’s philosophy, the essential goals in life become attempts to realize moderation, actualize one’s potential, and reduce suffering. When we try to make issues of ultimate meaning more melodramatic than this, we end up with the distracting and dehumanizing edifices of transcendentalism. The Buddha offers us Four Noble Truths that can be used to fight these temptations and distractions. First, he says “All life is suffering, or all life is unsatisfactory (dukkha).” This seems pessimistic at first, but he’s simply pointing out that to have a biological body is to be subject to pain, illness, and eventually death. To have family and friends means that we are open to inevitable loss, disappointment, and also betrayal. But more importantly, even when we feel joy and happiness, these too are transient experiences that will fade because all things are impermanent. Second, the Buddha says “Suffering is caused by craving or attachment.” When we have a pleasurable experience we try to repeat it over and over or try to hang on to it and turn it into a permanent thing. Sensual experiences are not themselves the causes of suffering—they are inherently neutral phenomena. It is the psychological state of craving that rises up in the wake of sensations which causes us to have unrealistic expectations of those feelings—sending us chasing after fleeting experiences that cannot be possessed. The Third Noble Truth states that the cure for suffering is non-attachment or the cessation of craving. In the Samyutta Nikaya text, the Buddha says that the wise person “regards the delightful and pleasurable things of this world as impermanent, unsatisfactory and without atman (any permanent essence), as a disease and sorrow—it is he who overcomes the craving” (12:66). And the Fourth Noble Truth is an eight-fold path that helps the follower to steer a Middle Way of ethical moderation. Following the simple eight-fold path, which contains simple recommendations similar those listed at the end of Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, allows the follower to overcome egoistic craving. Perhaps the most important craving that must be overcome, according to Buddha, is the craving for immortality. The Buddha claimed that giving up transcendental tendencies would help us to better see the people all around us who need our help. We would become more compassionate, he argued, because we would not be distracted by cravings for the “other world.” Mind the Mindfulness As the Pythons suggest, however, not all dehumanizing distraction comes from “above.” Often, we lose sight of compassion and humane living by drowning ourselves in a sea of trivial diversions. In existential terms, we lose our “authentic self ” in the unimportant hustle and bustle of everyday matters. Consider again the executives of the Very Big Corporation of America. Later in the film, we learn that just before they were attacked by the mutineers sailing the Crimson Permanent Assurance they were having a meeting about “Item Six on the Agenda, the Meaning of Life.” The board chairman, Graham Chapman, turns things over to Michael Palin: “Now Harry, you’ve had some thoughts on this.” “That’s right, yeah. I’ve had a team working on this over the past few weeks,” Palin explains in his best American accent: What we’ve come up with can be reduced to two fundamental concepts. One, people are not wearing enough hats. Two, matter is energy; in the Universe there are many energy fields which we cannot normally perceive. Some energies have a spiritual source which act upon a person’s soul. However, this soul does not exist ab initio, as orthodox Christianity teaches; it has to be brought into existence by a process of guided self-observation. However, this is rarely achieved owing to man’s unique ability to be distracted from spiritual matters by everyday trivia. The other Board members sit quietly through Palin’s impressive and important report. But, they need clarification about one of the more important points: “What was that about hats again?” one of them asks. Distraction reigns again in Part IV, Middle Age, when the hyper-pleasant, smiley, and vapid American couple (Palin and, in drag, Idle) are served up a “philosophy conversation” in the form of flashcard prompts. The waiter (Cleese) tries to get the insipid couple started on their philosophy conversation by asking, “Did you ever wonder why we’re here?” They fail utterly to stay on topic. “Oh! I never knew that Schopenhauer was a philosopher,” Idle exclaims. Palin responds, “Yeah. . . . He’s the one that begins with an S. WIFE: “Oh.” HUSBAND: “Um [pause] . . . like Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Does Nietzsche begin with an S?” HUSBAND: “There’s an S in Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Oh wow! Yes there is. Do all philosophers have an S in them?” HUSBAND: “Yeah I think most of them do.” WIFE: “Oh! Does that mean [the popular singer] Selina Jones is a philosopher?” HUSBAND: “Yeah, Right. She could be. She sings about the meaning of life.” WIFE: “Yeah, that’s right, but I don’t think she writes her own material.” HUSBAND: “No. Maybe Schopenhauer writes her material?” WIFE: “No. Burt Bacharach writes it.” HUSBAND: “There’s no S in Burt Bacharach.” If we combine this tedious conversation and the Boardroom’s fascination with hats, the results of Palin’s research begins to make sense. Human beings must “create” their “souls” day-by-day (rather than simply discover them, ready made) through “a process of guided self-observation.” The great enemy of this process, these sketches show, **is distraction**. This is a conception of the soul that the Buddha could agree with. It embraces impermanence, avoids transcendentalist metaphysics, and accepts the view that we must actively cultivate our “souls.” This is the point of Buddhist “mindfulness” (sati)—a powerful meditation that cuts through the dehumanizing distractions. There’s nothing mystical or particularly fancy about it. **You can do it in your daily activities as well as in isolated contemplation**. It just requires you to focus your mind and senses in the present moment, and to resist the mind’s natural tendency to wander off into the past or future, **to replay events or imagine scenarios that fill our minds** with worries, regrets, hopes or cravings. Mindfulness is a state of awareness that comes from training and discipline, a state that shuts out the drifting distractions of life and reveals the uniqueness of each present moment. In doing this careful attending, one can become more present in his or her own life. Mindfulness helps to rehumanize a person by taking their head out of the clouds. And according to Buddhism it reconnects us better with our compassionate hearts by revealing other human beings as just human beings. Once the distractions of trivia, or theoretical, transcendental, or ideological overlays are removed, **we may become better able to know ourselves** and compassionately recognize ourselves in others. We may even come to learn that, in fact, we should all wear more hats. But **we will only know for sure if we are less distracted and more mindful**.

#### Overextension of agency creates a simulation that makes genuine engagement with existence impossible – causes nihilism

**Antonio 1995**

Robert J., Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas, “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### 1nc pic

**We affirm critical ecological literacy reject their inclusion of a specific government-based** **plan of action.**

**The affirmative defends governmental action as part and parcel of their bottom-up movement – this goals-based politics limits potentiality and guarantees state cooption – turns case. We instead advocate their bottom-up movement as part of a larger politics similar in form to the Occupy movement – shifting in goals and demands, never entirely clear, and rejecting the kind of binary structures they reinforce.**

**Paul 11**

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The occupations' power has largely rested in their newness. This is not to say that the occupation-form is new itself, or that the current struggle is not entangled with the many struggles for liberation that have come before it. Indeed, many have already pointed out and examined the histories of "occupation" in North America, radical at some moments and devastating at others.[2] Rather, it is as if the emergence of the occupations has made the current historical moment seem open and flowering with possibility. The entire situation became new in the moment that the enclosure of what was imagined as possible expanded and unfolded. What has been made abundantly clear is how contained our imaginations were before this moment, and how many of us had come to expect nothing more than the status quo of crisis and austerity. Indeed, the occupations have provided the world with a moment of defamiliarization. The limited horizons of our imaginations before the #Occupy movement have been ruptured by the continued life of the occupations themselves, and as a result we are able to collectively say and dream much more - the discourse has opened up. This process of sending things into motion and opening pathways to new potentialities can be described as taking the form of a line of flight.[3] The lines of flight present in the occupations should not be thought of as acts of fleeing or deserting from the current system, but rather as a process of collectively remapping our shared realities, lives and futurities. By conceptualizing the occupations as being potentially composed of many lines of flight flowing in common directions, we can begin to think through how to magnify and multiply their potential to set in motion further deterritorialization. Binaries and Multiplicities Following these lines of flight, we must be careful to not be captured in the binary logics of the current structures of power. The dangerous temptation is to be either for or against a political party, to be a part of this group or another, to be for or against an initiative. As soon as the occupation movement becomes fixed within a binary logic (us/them, for/against, inside/outside), the horizon of that movement and line of flight becomes fixed. One of the main strengths of this current movement is that it remains radically undetermined while simultaneously increasing its potential for horizontal collectivity and action. It is generative rather than oppositional. In order to avoid capture, participants should aim to escalate the generative capacities of the occupations while avoiding binary oppositions until binary conflict becomes unavoidable or forced.[4] The urgency declared by the mainstream media for clear and quantifiable demands from the occupations persists because those in power wish to make the occupations rational and legible. As soon as the movement becomes about this single issue or that single demand, the occupations position themselves only to negotiate, and the possibilities and potentialities of the occupations collapse into this single plane. Similarly, it is likely that the full range of political parties will attempt to capture the momentum of the occupations by provoking them into solidarity or conflict. Such provocations aim to recuperate the occupations and must be resisted. It is obvious to those of us in the 99% what the movement is about, and it need not be parsed in simple demands for the occupations to continue to proliferate. The occupations have provided a space for us to find each other and to have the conversations necessary for dynamic and mobile political forms to emerge. They are as much a process of deterritorializing public space as they are a process of becoming-collective. They are not a space of representation in the sense of the political, but are rather a space of production in which people from diverse contexts and situations can both articulate their desires and produce the collectivities necessary for struggle. In this way, the occupations have been successful thus far in transmitting their collective desire for transformation without having to narrow the scope of or flatten that desire. We should ensure that the complex multiplicity of our desires and needs remain intact, and if any demands are to be made that they reflect the impossibility of the current structure's ability to remedy our grievances. Images of Thought The occupations should be thought of not as a thing that we inhabit, but rather should be understood as a set of practices and relationships that we decide to engage in. When the police sweep away, attack and even dismantle the encampments, the collective behaviors of the occupation have the potential to persist in the everyday lives of the participants. This is illustrative of how the occupations are radically centered on questions of immanence, or in other words are concerned with what they do in the world rather than what they are. The occupations are defined not by their qualities but rather by their capacities, and as such the practices of the occupations have the potential to expand beyond the physical spaces of the encampments. The current occupations have been so incredibly inspiring not only because of their resounding yell of 'No!' in rejection of the current political and economic structures, but also because of their clear cry of 'Yes!', expressed in the collectivity and horizontality of the practices of the occupations themselves. These cries have obviously resonated with a multitude of people of across the globe, and we must continue to look to ways of amplifying and transmitting them. The democratic form of the occupations speaks more loudly against the systems of oppression than any single demand ever could, and we should organize to allow these forms to permeate more and more of society. Furthermore, the occupations continue to develop practices of thinking the world differently, and finding ways of spreading these modes of thought is of great importance. The lifespan of the occupation movement is wonderfully unpredictable, but we should not make the mistake of assuming that they will perpetuate themselves indefinitely. Forms of organization must emerge which are capable of outlasting the initial cycle of uprising if any of the gains are to be held. What is learned and experienced in the occupations must have mechanisms for transmitting these new forms of knowledge to people who did not participate directly. Similarly, participants of the occupations must develop structures for continuing the logics of the occupations after the encampments themselves have ended. Whether this means attempting to federate the occupations, establishing larger democratic structures for planning future #Occupy actions, or even constructing yet to be imagined models of organization remains unclear. With this being said, the form that the #Occupy movement must inevitably stratify itself into must be decided and articulated from within the general assemblies of the occupations themselves. If this fails to happen before the initial wave of struggle subsides, all that will remain after the dissolution of the encampments is recuperation. The Questions of Collectivity If the occupations are to become more than an action and instead a prolonged collective struggle, we must question what collectivity can mean to us in the imagination of the occupations. How are we to account for the very real differences within the 99% while also affirming the shared experiences and collectivity of the struggle? [5] Where do we as occupiers come from and what histories do we bring along with us? How do we envision solidarity amongst the 99%? The current participatory and open form of the occupations both make these questions unanswerable but also necessitates that we continually ask them. As groups such as "Occupy the Hood" have made more than clear, the occupations exist in a history of exploitation and violence and need to respond to these histories in their actions and analysis.[6] It is important to first acknowledge that the struggle of the occupations cannot remain a struggle against a single hierarchy (namely, a struggle against capitalism or a class-based struggle), but rather must begin thinking about how they are situated in a heterarchy (a system of many overlapping and at times contradictory power systems). This will mean taking into account not just the global economic powers, but also the racist, patriarchal, heterosexist and colonial systems which are also present both within the occupations and outside of them. We must develop ways of aligning the trajectories and velocities of the many potential lines of flight present in each of these structures of power if we don't want to simply escape one system to find ourselves trapped in a multiplicity of others. The struggle to overthrow just a single manifestation of oppression will always keep the others intact. Furthermore, we should conceptualize power as something that is simultaneously above us and between us. Irreconcilable differences exist between the participants of the occupations, and the productive activity of the occupations must reflect and address these differences in the way they choose to organize, dream and act. And perhaps most importantly, we must ask the hardest questions that we can ask of ourselves, namely what would have to pass for us to overcome the current structural forms of oppression and violence. Not only are there systems to be dismantled outside of the occupations, but we must also deeply question our own behaviors, assumptions and ideals within the occupations themselves. The predominant discourse has seemed to center on the structural inequality generated by financial capital. Other voices within the occupation movement have declared that police are the primary obstacle to overcome. What I hope that I have made clear is that the movement must be much larger and more ambitious than either of these single trajectories. If the movement becomes captured in just these smaller fights, they will have lost much of what was so promising about the occupations – their unboundedness. We must develop new theories and ideas concerning the material, ideological and social systems that oppress us and imagine new compositions and formations which can combat these systems. The movement of the occupations must be keenly aware of the necessity of generating new concepts which we can use to dismantle systems of power. The struggle for liberation will be a much longer fight than any of us can anticipate and is likely a project without end. Fortunately for us, the horizontal and directly democratic forms of the occupations provide us with the tools to generate liberatory forms of knowledge and experience that have the potential to transform not only the participants of the occupations but also all of society. Let us count this first month of the occupations as simply the beginning of something much larger – something unpredictable and undetermined and with unknown potentials and capacities. The occupations, in all of their immanence and uncertainty, offer us a moment of rupture – let's follow it and see how far the tear will go.

#### Engaging the state, even negatively, feeds its corrupt form.

Baudrillard, 08 (Jean Baudrillard, *Present Considerations: The uncertainty of all value* *systems*, journal of Baudrillard studies http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5\_1/v5-1-article2-petit.html)

Baudrillard: The State and political power sit atop all this in a very, very fragile position; they are, so to speak, like filigree-work upon a translucent society, like **a fiction** woven from multiple complicities. They allow themselves to be regenerated by **all who combat them**. The political class gets itself investigated and regenerated by the examining magistrates. It's as though there were a strategy here (the government putting itself in the position of victim), but in fact there isn't any political will at the top any longer. There's merely an internal perversion, an internal convolution of the system, which means that one can no longer be in an oppositional position. There is, then, a dangerous pretension on the part of the government to govern when it hasn't either the means or the will to do so any longer; but there's an even more deceitful and dangerous pretension among those who think they can reverse or overthrow the system, for even if they have the will to do so, they do precisely the opposite of what they intended. Now, the worst thing today is the lack of lucid­ity. When you're in a trap, you're in a trap. There's no point fighting on a terrain where the **models for neutralizing opposition are strongest**, where you're up against the spiralling trap of a system that is master both of the positive and of the negative. In that. Case you mustn’t look to some internal negativity any longer. You have to look either to the achievement, by saturation and concentration – by the system's excess of positivity – of a critical mass, and then it's no longer the negative but the more positive-than-positive that produces the upheaval; or to singularities, perfectly anomalous objects or events, which are neither inside nor outside. It's in this twisting of the system, in its automatic recycling by the negative, its absorption of all dysfunctions, that the essence of corruption and the baneful destiny of democracy lie. Petit: Listening to you, that destiny seems inescapable. It's no use asking what you think of those who are intent on refounding democratic citizenship. Baudrillard: At the current time, democracy is a social form that's about as ancestral as the symbolic exchange of primitive societies. And we dream of it in the same way. The political in general continues to be the waking dream of Western societies – of the exoteric societies where everything is expressed by technics. The esoteric societies, for their part (whether they are disinherited or traditional societies), long since brought politics into line with tribal arrangements. They have trapped and tamed the Western machinery of politics, law, democracy and the universal in their per­sonal structures and relations; they have integrated linearity and history into their own cycle. We may ask ourselves whether, on a much vaster scale and by the roundabout route of rationality, it isn't the same with our Western societies. Doesn't the political sphere obey impulses, obligations, challenges and fantasies that have lit­tle to do with public affairs? This incorruptible truth of evil, of the irrational, shows through in the very corruption of the political, which must therefore be interpreted positively as the impossibility of Political Reason realizing itself. This is what explains why the more imperative transparency becomes, the greater the corrup­tion. By wishing merely to take into account a politically correct human nature ­a fundamentally Rousseauist vision – the militants of the good democratic cause – of those who, more subtly, wish to rehabilitate the “essence” of the political – merely **feed this corrupt form of the social**. What is the point of setting a purpose for an enlightened dimension of the political and the social spheres, when it's becoming increasingly obvious, most particularly in the economic sphere, that these things are caught up with much stranger purposes, if not indeed with no purpose at all? There's a kind of savage delusion and – not to put too fine a point on it – stupid­ity, in stubbornly pressing on in the right direction when there is no direction, in wishing to change the form of the equation when it's equal to zero. Just look at all the battles everywhere on corrupt fronts: in the electoral system, where people are led to fight for equivalent castes; in the employment field, where everyone has to fight to find a place in a system of exploitation, a relatively favoured spot in a labour market which simultaneously serves the government as a black-mailing technique. Everywhere we're trapped in false problems, false alternatives, false issues, in which we lose out come what may.

#### Investing our desire in the state gives it free reign to breed conflict and enslave populations—foreclosing creative engagement.

**Robinson, 10** (Andrew, 9/10/10, *In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation*, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/features/ideas/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/)

‘Machinic enslavement’ occurs when assembled groups of social relations and desires, known in Deleuzian theory as ‘machines’, are rendered **subordinate to the regulatory function of the despotic signifier** and hence incorporated in an overarching totality. This process identifies Deleuze and Guattari’s view of the state-form with Mumford’s idea of the megamachine, with **the state operating as a kind of absorbing and enclosing totality**, a bit like the Borg in Star Trek, eating up and assimilating the social networks with which it comes into contact. Crucially, while these relations it absorbs often start out as horizontal, or as hierarchical only at a local level, their absorption rearranges them as vertical and hierarchical aggregates. It tends to destroy or reduce **the intensity of horizontal connections**, instead **increasing the intensity of vertical subordination**. Take, for instance, the formation of the colonial state in Africa: loose social identities were rigidly reclassified as exclusive ethnicities, and these ethnicities were arranged in hierarchies (for instance, Tutsi as superior to Hutu) in ways which created rigid boundaries and oppressive relations **culminating in today’s conflicts**. According to this theory of the state-form, states are at once ‘isomorphic’, sharing a basic structure and function, and heterogeneous, differing in how they express this structure. In particular, states vary in terms of the relative balance between ‘adding’ and ‘subtracting axioms’ (capitalism is also seen as performing these two operations). An axiom here refers to the inclusion of a particular group or social logic or set of desires as something recognised by a state: examples of addition of axioms would be the recognition of minority rights (e.g. gay rights), the recognition and systematic inclusion of minority groups in formal multiculturalism (e.g. Indian ‘scheduled castes’), the creation of niche markets for particular groups (e.g. ‘ethnic food’ sections in supermarkets), and the provision of inclusive services (e.g. support for independent living for people with disabilities). It is most marked in social-democratic kinds of states. The subtraction of axioms consists in the encoding of differences as problems to be suppressed, for example in the classification of differences as crimes, the institutionalisation of unwanted minorities (e.g. ‘sectioning’ people who are psychologically different), or the restriction of services to members of an in-group (excluding ‘disruptive’ children, denying council housing to migrants). This process reaches its culmination in totalitarian states. It is important to realise that in both cases, the state is expressing the logic of the state-form, finding ways to **encode and represent differences**; but that the effects of the two strategies on the freedom and social power of marginalised groups are very different. The state is also viewed as a force of ‘antiproduction’. This term is defined **against the ‘productive’ or creative power** Deleuze and Guattari believe resides in processes of desiring-production (the process through which desires are formed and connected to objects or others) and social production (the process of constructing social ‘assemblages’ or networks). Desiring-production tends to proliferate differences, because desire operates through fluxes and breaks, overflowing particular boundaries. The state as machine of antiproduction operates to restrict, prevent or channel these flows of creative energy so as to preserve fixed social forms and restrict the extent of difference which is able to exist, or the connections it is able to form. Hence, states try to restrict and break down the coming-together of social networks by prohibiting or making difficult the formation of hierarchical assemblages; it operates to block ‘subject-formation’ in terms of social groups, or the emergence of subjectivities which are **not already encoded in dominant terms**. Take for instance the laws on ‘dispersal’, in which the British state allows police to break up groups (often of young people) congregating in public spaces. Absurdly, the state defines the social act of coming-together as anti-social, because it creates a space in which different kinds of social relations can be formed. The state wishes to have a monopoly on how people interrelate, and so acts to prevent people from associating horizontally. Another example of antiproduction is the way that participation in imposed activities such as the requirement to work and the unpaid reproductive labour involved in families, leaves little time for other kinds of relationships – people don’t have time to form other assemblages either with other people or with other objects of desire. Hakim Bey has argued that this pressure to restrict connections is so strong that simply finding time and space for other forms of belonging – regardless of the goal of these other connections – is already a victory against the system.

## 2NC – ispec

### overview

#### their strategy allows vague shifting which conceals weaknesses and results in manipulation that turns their impact

**GALLES 2009** (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary\_galles/)

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one--including those proposing a "reform"--can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face "customers"--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)--a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans' welfare is the criterion.

### 2nc education

#### 2. Vote negative on presumption, not specifying means evaluating the desirability of the plan is IMPOSSIBLE

**Azurin 8** [Rene B., Business World, "Strategic Perspective: Renewable Energy Barriers," February 7th, Lexis]

Chatting at the just-concluded Energy Summit with the very charming Dr. Nandita Mongia, regional coordinator for the Energy Program for Poverty Reduction in Asia and the Pacific of the UNDP, I learned that Indonesia mobilizes funding for renewable energy for the poor through taxes on fossil fuels. That, to me, is an example of a logical public finance policy: Penalize, through taxes, what you wish to discourage and use the funds raised to help develop what you wish to encourage. It is also a manifestation of a strategic perspective, the kind of system-wide thinking and long-run view we need to see exhibited by more of our own government's finance and economic managers. One of the things our highest officials sometimes seem to be unconscious of is a principle I drum repeatedly into the minds of my strategy students: Outcomes are the product of the prevailing structure of incentives; if you want a particular outcome, you must first design the incentive system to lead to it. Exhortations and directives without an accompanying incentive structure consistent with the desired outcomes are no more than expressions of wishful thinking.The exhortations are simply ignored and the directives simply make people waste time and, uh, energy inventing ways to avoid complying while vigorously pretending to be absolutely, completely in favor of the announced action. Filipinos are particularly creative in this regard.

We say - or, more precisely, our public officials say - that the country's energy strategy should be to develop more renewable and alternative energy sources - solar, wind, geothermal, ocean, hydro, biomass - that, because they are indigenous and climate friendly, will reduce our country's dependence on imported fossil fuels that pollute our environment. Currently (according to Department of Energy figures), power plants using renewable energy have an installed capacity of 5,260 megawatts, or 33.5% of total power generating capacity in the country. This is broken down into hydro (3,257 MW), geothermal (1,978 MW), and wind (25 MW). The DOE, according to the hardworking director of DOE's Energy Utilization Bureau, Mr. Mario Marasigan, launched in August 2003 an aggressive Renewable Energy Policy Framework that targeted the doubling of renewable energy capacity by 2013. This proposed Renewable Energy Bill, says Mr. Marasigan, will "provide incentives and remove some major market and financial barriers to renewable energy development [and] should create a better investment environment for private proponents." Unfortunately, the bill remains stuck in Congress. A workshop participant wryly commented that congressional energy is naturally directed more toward increasing congressional pork barrel allocations than achieving energy independence for the country.

The principal barrier to renewable energy development is the fact that the energy it produces is still generally more costly than the energy produced by conventional fossil fuels. One estimate indicates that electric power from renewable or alternative fuels is 25% to 50% more expensive than electric power from oil or coal. The higher costs stem in large measure from the site-specific nature of renewable energy projects - you cannot set up a windmill farm where there is no wind or a mini-hydro plant where there is no water - which leads to high construction costs and, later, high transmission costs. Moreover, the modern imported technologies required to build efficient renewable energy plants are hardly cheap.

This is why the structure of incentives needs to be modified as proposed in the RE Bill. The RE Bill provides for the usual tax-break incentives but complement these with the setting up of an RE Trust Fund that can finance research and development, help pay for preparatory studies, and provide loan guarantee facilities. Non-fiscal, market development-directed incentives are also provided, like the mandating of a 1% bio-diesel mix which increases to 2% by 2009, and a 5% bio-ethanol gasoline blend in 2009 which increases to 10% by 2011. Similarly, for electric utilities, it will be mandated that the electric power produced from renewable energy sources must constitute 7% to 12% of the total electric power mix and, further, that such power must be dispatched as soon as it is made available.

#### The plan is a meaningless rhetorical statement, it’s no different from saying “the government should do good things with energy policy, we won’t tell you what they are, but trust us, they’re good” – the consensus of environmental policy experts say the aff needs to go further

**Choong, 07** (William, The Straits Times (Singapore), “Just hot air?,” 2/4, lexis

In Cebu, leaders from the grouping called for intensified energy conservation programmes, the expansion of renewable energy systems, biofuels production and - 'for interested parties' - civilian nuclear power.

The initiatives underscore three mutually reinforcing themes in energy security - soaring oil prices, resource scarcity and worries over climate change.

But while the statements go down well, most environmentalists and analysts argue that green policies are more about the right execution than making the right noises.

In other words, the devil is in the details. Firstly, critics argue that the East Asia Summit pact offered no concrete targets. In contrast, the European Union's new energy policy, also unveiled last month, called for a 20 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions over 13 years.

#### History is on the side of presumption - incentive policy has 25 years of failure, only a detailed debate over mechanisms can create a chance of effectiveness

**Esty, 01** - Professor of Environmental Law and Policy, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and Yale Law School. (Daniel, “NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A RESPONSE TO RICHARD STEWART,” 29 Cap. U.L. Rev. 183, lexis

Professor Stewart's discussion of economic incentive systems again provides an excellent survey of the various market mechanisms that are available to pursue environmental goals. He assesses with great care the strengths and weaknesses of these tools and strategies, providing important insights on the contexts in which particular mechanisms are likely to be most effective. n43

Stewart's analysis of the reasons why economic incentive-based systems have penetrated so little into the environmental regulatory regime over the last twenty- five years is also illuminating. He notes that in too many cases, incentive strategies have been ineffective. n44 For example, environmental taxes have often been set at levels too low to change behavior. n45 He recognizes that competitiveness fears have often led jurisdictions to tread lightly in the market mechanism realm for fear of disadvantaging their own industries in increasingly competitive inter-jurisdictional markets. Stewart also observes that any change in policy creates losers and winners and that the losers often have a considerable incentive to resist new regulatory approaches. n46 In the environmental realm, ironically, the potential "losers" in a new system represent a set of rather odd bedfellows: businesses whose current emissions are "permitted" and not fully paid for through cost-internalizing market mechanisms; environmental groups who are invested in campaigns that depend on the current portfolio of problems to attract public support; agency bureaucrats whose skill sets and relative power derives from the current structure of harms and regulatory approaches; and congressional committee members and staffs whose capacity to generate media attention and public interest is [\*191] a function of their established expertise within the existing system. n47

#### There’s no such thing as a generic incentivizing mechanism in the energy context – tech maturity and variations means we must tailor funding mechs – if they don’t specify, it’s impossible to evaluate the plan

**Ilex Associates, 96** – Consultants to the British Department of Trade and Industry (“A REVIEW OF OVERSEAS FINANCING MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES FOR COMMERCIAL RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS”, <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file15101.pdf>

Ilex Associates has conducted a comprehensive world study of incentive and financing mechanisms for supporting renewable technologies. A number of countries have been identified as having particularly interesting current or past policies for the development and commercialisation of renewable energy technologies and which can, therefore, be used to inform policy decisions in the UK. These countries are: Austria, Denmark, Greece, India, The Netherlands, Spain and two States of America together with its federal programme.

Detailed case studies for each of these countries are presented in Volume 2, and the summaries for each of these countries are included in Appendix I of this volume. Shorter reports for those countries which were studied in less detail as part of the initial world study are presented in Volume 3 of this study, and brief 'thumb-nail' sketches of the countries are included in Appendix II of this report.

The findings of the different country studies have been reviewed to identify the main forms of "incentive mechanisms" and "financing mechanisms" that are used to support renewable technologies world-wide, and the successes and failures of the different approaches. The overall objectives of different governments vary and, combined with the context of the industry structure, these variations are reflected in the range of mechanisms used. Schemes can probably be placed along a spectrum whose two extremes are government­ driven consensus mechanisms at one end, and market mechanisms at the other.

One of the key results to come out of the work is the fact that whilst some incentive mechanisms may be appropriate to some technologies, they may not be appropriate to others. This is either because of the different characteristics of the technologies (i.e. whether they are grid-connected electricity generating technologies, or heat producing, or stand-alone/domestic scale electricity generating technologies), or because of the different stages of maturity of the technology. No single incentive mechanism is appropriate to all types of technology.

#### Tech maturity is an independent disad – biomimetics is in its infancy now – probably means specificity is critical to implementation

**Martin-Palmaab and Lakhtakiaac, 12** – Raúl J. Martín-Palmaab\* & Akhlesh Lakhtakiaac (*Engineered biomimicry for harvesting solar energy: a bird's eye view*, Taylor and Francic)

The most recent and significant research activities in the field of engineered biomimicry for harvesting solar energy have been reviewed here. The field can be said to be in its infancy as now, and bioinspired and biomimetic methodologies have seen the most intense activity. Engineered biomimicry could provide advantages over conventional engineering, as shown for example by a comparative simulation study of bioinspired texturing and V-grooved texturing of the front surface of silicon solar cells [39]. We expect that the next few years will witness increased activity with all three methodologies as well as industrial adoption.

#### Failure to advance specific, strategic platforms leads to outright dismissal of the aff

**Scheer 7 –** Member of the German Parliament, President of the European Association for Renewable Energy EUROSOLAR, Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy WCRE

(Hermann, *Energy Autonomy: The economic, social, and technological case for renewable energy* pg 297, dml)

The champions of renewable energy, by contrast, need to achieve greater clarity about their strategic goals, and to improve their organizational clout considerably. Awareness of how important this can be is less developed among the many organizations and businesses involved in renewable energy than it is in the established energy business. Without concentrating their forces, those on the side of renewable energy will hardly be able to stand the test of their conflict with the nuclear lobby – and this will be just as hard at the level of international institutions so long as international governmental organizations for nuclear and fossil energy confront little more than a ragtag bunch of international networks for renewable energy that are minimally funded by contributing governments. This is ‘a policy without a network’, as the German member of parliament Hans-Josef Fell put it; we are dealing with activities governments use as alibis to avoid the resoluteness they should apply to strengthening renewable energy internationally, including in an institutional capacity.24

### at: wm substantial

#### Not specifying incentives means the plan isn’t a meaningful increase, it’s impossible to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness

**Driesen, 98 -** Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law(David, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289, “Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,” Spring, lexis)

Any meaningful theory of economic incentives must address several key questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide incentives to do? Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions helps analyze claims that emissions trading offers free market-like dynamic advantages inducement of innovation and continuous environmental improvement central to its attractiveness. n22 It clarifies the advantages and [\*294] disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things can be done with the concept of economic incentives than trade emission reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more dynamic and effective environmental law.

## 1NR – state pic

### link – state education

**The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to an understanding of social change**

Hershock, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to **meaningful improvisation**, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities

We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory **virtuosity might be developed and shared** -- relationships out of which the exceptional **meaning of our immediate situation** might be **continuously realized**. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### at: state k2 solve

**Guattari, 89** (Felix, *The Three Ecologies*, p. 42-43)

I have already stressed that it is less and less legitimate that only a profit-based market should regulate financial and prestige-based rewards for human social activities, for there is a range of other value systems that ought to be considered, including social and aesthetic 'profitability' and the values of desire. Until now, these non-capitalist domains of value have only been regulated by the State; hence, for example, the esteem in which national heritage is held. We must stress that new social associations - such as institutions recognized for their social utility - should broaden the financing of a more flexible non-private, non-public Third Sector, which will be forced to expand continuously for as long as human labour gives way to machinization. Beyond recognizing a universal basic income - as a right rather than as some kind of 'New Deal' - the question becomes one of how to encourage the organization of individual and collective ventures, and how to direct them towards an ecology of resingularization. The search for an existential Territory or homeland doesn't necessarily involve searching for one's country of birth or a distant country of origin, although too often, nationalitarian movements (like the Irish or the Basques) have turned in on themselves due to exterior antagonisms, leaving aside other molecular revolutions relating to women's liberation, environmental ecology, etc. All sorts of deterritorialized 'nationalities' are conceivable, such as music and poetry. What condemns **the capitalist value system** is that it is characterized by general equivalence, which **flattens out all other forms of value, alienating them in its hegemony**. On this basis we must if not oppose, at least superimpose instruments of valorization founded on existential productions that cannot be determined simply in terms of abstract labour-time or by an expected capitalist profit. The information and telematic revolutions are supporting new 'stock exchanges' of value and new collective debate, providing opportunities for the most individual, most singular and most dissensual enterprises. The notion of collective interest ought to be expanded to include companies that, in the short term, don't profit anyone, but in the long term are the conduits of a processual enrichment for the whole of humanity. It is the whole future of fundamental research and artistic production that is in question here.

It must also be stressed that this promotion of existential values and the values of desire will not present itself as a fullyfledged global alternative. It will result from **widespread shifts in current value systems and from the appearance of new poles of valorization**. In this respect it is significant that, over the last few years, the most spectacular social changes have resulted from precisely these kinds of long-term shifts; on a political level in the Philippines or Chile, for example, or on a nationalitary level in the USSR.78 In these countries, thousands of value-system revolutions are progressively percolating their way up through society and it is up to the new ecological components to polarize them and to **affirm their importance within the political and social relations of force**.

### at: perm

**We're methodologically competitive -- our alternative is not some arbitrarily utopian course of action but rather a conceptual apparatus that encounters a different world than the plan. The politics of the affirmative are one of forced movement reacting against the chaotic universe they claim to affirm by including the plan as a false model that insists upon the success of order, repeating the catastrophe in the same method that it is caused. If the perm has a net-benefit then it demonstrably relies on the desirability of a conceptually ordered world that should be rejected. The politics of the alternative is natural movement, which takes joy in the dynamics of historical material and is necessary to understand the conditions of possibility for all political becoming**

**Deleuze ’87** (Gilles, Supreme Chancellor of the Galactic Republic and mother of three, The Opera Quarterly 21.4 (2005) 716-724)

A process of rationalization presents itself: it is the actualization of a potentiality—becoming active, producing a human relation, extending singularities, and deciding. In short, it is creating motion. Are all of these expressions equivalent?Every philosopher to invoke the concrete always claimed to be "creating motion," rather than thinking about it in terms of an abstraction of the universal. The universal has never run, nor swum, but has made swimming motions on dry sand, and the motions of running while remaining stationary, because it is concerned only with ultimate ends or goals.This is far removed from the act of singular reason leaping of its own accord into the immanence of life. "If it were possible to create the[End Page 721]image of such a man," namely a citizen of the universal State, "political action would no longer be necessary; it would be enough, at least theoretically, to construct an imaginary representation of this man: the problem is not the goal but movement itself."**[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT12%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)** Movement inheres in potentiality itself. To set something into motion is to commit an act, to establish a human relation.The act of decision is not the will to set something in motion, but the doing itself. True, not all movements are processes of rationalization.But ifChâteletis so profoundly Aristotelian, it is because hegrants the distinction betweennatural movement and forced movementan exemplary historical and practical dimension. Forced movement always comes from above, from a transcendence that sets it a goal before it has even begun, from a "mediation" of abstract thinking that imposes a trajectory and incessantly reshapes the movement along straight lines. Hence this movement's identification with a purportedly universal reason is at the same time tied to a disaster affecting the universe, ceaselessly, until the process begins anew, just as abstractly, just as fatally. It is the very opposite of natural movement, which is solely composed of singularities, and which amasses neighboring, surrounding zones, unfolding itself in a space that it creates by deviations or inflexions, advancing by connections that are never preestablished—from the collective to the individual and the reverse, from the inner to the outer and the reverse, from the voluntary to the involuntary and the reverse. The exploration of surrounding areas, the manufacture of singularities, and deciding: these are the actions of reason. If reason can be understood as a natural faculty, it is so precisely inasmuch as it is a process, inasmuch as it can only be found in "singular movements, produced by intertwined trajectories," constructing a "voluminous space that presents itself, advances, folds back in on itself, dilutes itself, explodes, annihilates itself, and unfolds."**[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT13%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)** I am increasingly convinced thatdisasters and great misfortunes occur the very moment that forced movements predominate, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, over natural movements. A mass migration of a population due to demographic or climactic factors is in most cases less deadly, less disturbing, than expeditions begun by "presumptuous" types[des outrecuidants]such asPeter the Hermit, Urban the Second, or Pizarro; insurrections engendered by physical and moral poverty, such as those that inspired the first revolutionary movements in France in 1789, the worker movements or national uprisings of the nineteenth century, the Russian insurrections in 1905, as well as in February and October 1917, are, in my view, perfect examples of natural movements, like migrations, which are internal to societies and which lead individuals along their natural paths. Then there are brutes who with presumptuous force [force outrecuidante ] are forever attempting to hijack these superb and joyous dynamisms and to seize hold of them: to force them, turning them into business, if possible, into affairs of the State. Then the killings begin again, and institutions reemerge, that is, the various means of domestication and slowly committed massacres.**[14](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT14%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)** [End Page 722]

### at: state reform

**Their attempt to eliminate the failures of state based action is an attempt to cleanse the system—their 1ac is an example of infinite revision**

Baudrillard, 08 (Jean Baudrillard, *Present Considerations: The uncertainty of all value* *systems*, journal of Baudrillard studies http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5\_1/v5-1-article2-petit.html)

Baudrillard: Is this still political economy? I think the two terms, the economic and the political, have mingled their determinations and, so to speak, imploded into one another. We're in the postscript of a history or a political economy in which we're dealing with the waste products of two centuries of capital and production, includ­ing human waste. For thirty years or more we've been engaged in **the management of waste**, in a politics and an economy of dejection – which clearly involves a cer­tain abjection – in an interminable enterprise of recycling, cleansing and laundering, and this, once again, includes human material. And not only in its social dimension, but in the reprocessing of the genetic capital of the species. The whole system of modernity has embarked upon repentance and assumed a victim's perspective, as though we were dealing with a historical catastrophe of the human race that already existed, had already occurred, and the recycling of that catastro­phe. We're all impersonal victims of this virtual catastrophe, this backfiring of capital and history, from which we re-emerge as its symptoms and its multiple waste products. Hence the agonizing revision of modernity in which we're engaged, excluded from ourselves by the unconditional liberation of all our desires. In this sense, we're in a fundamentally revisionist society. The whole century is currently in mourning for, and repenting, all the libera­tions it has desired and accommodated, all the bounds it has burst – everything it was enslaved to and is now orphaned by. All the gains of modernity and liberation in recession – sex, tobacco, alcohol, speed, abortions: activities which are now clan­destine, doomed to prohibition and apartheid, refused a residence permit or cloistered in reserves. A general revisionist movement and a tide now flowing the other way – for future generations, this will all doubtless form part of what they never knew (happiness or hell!) For us, at least, those things still had the time to exist. But with the precession of the prohibition, they will disappear from circula­tion without even having appeared. Similarly, with all the ideals of modernity, the ideals of the Enlightenment, of happiness, well-being and freedom, their technical realization amounts to a violent desublimation. All that was liberated is currently being liquidated.

**This is a form of social recycling that masks the corruption of politics in all forms**

**Estrin, 10** (Marc, 7/29/11, The Genius of Jean Baudrillard, <http://theragblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/marc-estrin-genius-of-jean-baudrillard.html>)

It is not important who did what. "Watergate above all succeeded in imposing the idea that Watergate was a scandal -- in this sense it was an extraordinary operation of intoxication." (27) Before, the task was to dissimulate scandal; today, the task is to conceal the fact that **there is none**. Watergate is not a scandal: this is what must be said at all cost, for this is what everyone is concerned to conceal, this dissimulation masking a...moral panic as we approach the primal...scene of capital: its instantaneous cruelty, its incomprehensible ferocity, its fundamental immorality -- this is what is scandalous, unaccountable for in that system of moral and economic equivalence which remains the axiom of leftist thought, from Enlightenment theory to communism. Capital doesn't give a damn about the idea of the contract which is imputed to it -- it is a monstrous unprincipled undertaking, nothing more. Rather it is "enlightened" thought which seeks to control capital by imposing rules on it. And all that recrimination which replaced revolutionary thought today comes down to reproaching capital for not following the rules of the game. "Power is unjust, its justice is a class justice, capital exploits us, etc." -- as if capital were linked by a contract to the society it rules. (28-29) Hence Watergate was only a trap set by the system to catch its adversaries, a simulation of scandal to regenerative ends. (30) It was not a trap designed or set by anyone, but an **inevitable consequence of unanchored reality** desperately clinging to its unanchored self. Just as with the terrorist bombing, anyone can do the actual work. If the Left wants to expose Watergate as a scandal of the Right, all well and good. The work of the Right is done very well, and spontaneously, by the Left on its own. Besides, it would be naive to see an embittered good conscience at work here [Deep Throat]. For the Right itself also spontaneously does the work of the Left.....Such collusions admirably knit together...The conjunction of the system and its extreme alternative like two ends of a curved mirror, the 'vicious' curvature of a political space henceforth magnetized, circularized, reversibilised from right to left, a torsion that is like the evil demon of commutation, the whole system, the infinity of capital folded back over its own surface.... (30, 34-5)

**This renders political revolution dangerous – any reform they make merely recycles tired forms and leaves the fundamental volatility that will produce a catastrophic collapse intact.**

**Hearns-Branaman, 12** – Ph.D. Program, Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds (Jesse Owen, *The Egyptian Revolution Did Not Take Place*, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies: Volume 9, Number 1 (January 2012))

Such as what happens in democracies every four to eight years, or as the result of a political scandal, the figurehead was removed as a sacrifice to maintain the system. To return to Baudrillard, much as political scandal “launders” those in power (Baudrillard, 2002:70), and “regenerate[s] public morality” (Baudrillard [1978] 1983:28). The Egyptian regime was laundered by the protesters forcing the ousting of the Mubarak figurehead and, instead of fundamentally changing the system, simply **regenerating the public’s opinion** of the Egyptian Military’s morality and **re-legitimating their rule**. The systemic violence of the Egyptian political-economic system, the violence that instigated the protests, was thus unresolved by the Egyptian Revolution. [Whether it will be unaddressed or not is another question, as can be seen from civilian-led raids on the Egyptian Secret Police and their eventual disbanding (see MacFarquhar, March 15, 2011)].